culmination of more than forty years of effort since the first mobile robot was developed in the late 1960's. DoD and DA have made significant progress in acquiring warfighting capabilities associated with UGVs over that time. This progress was enabled through the work of both departments and partners in government, academia, and industry. The work was guided by a variety of strategies from national strategic documents to science and technology master plans. This paper analyzes the existing DoD strategy and the emergent U.S. Army UGV strategy through the use of a framework developed for analyzing business strategy. Through this analysis, the need for a published, deliberate Army UGV strategy is identified and recommendations for inclusion in the strategy are proposed.
AN ANALYSIS OF U.S. ARMY UNMANNED GROUND VEHICLE STRATEGY
The U.S. Army does not have a published unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) strategy. This has been true since 1990 when the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) took policy, programmatic, and resourcing control of UGV development at the direction of Congress. 1 The lack of an Army UGV strategy and the analysis associated with developing that strategy has contributed to a number of concerns regarding the Army's current UGV fleet. These problems include: a fleet with a number of models having redundant capability, a requirement to provide long term sustainment for the current UGV fleet which is the result of a number of different and disjointed acquisition strategies by a variety of Department of Defense (DoD) agencies, a need to increase and synchronize the existing capability of the current UGV fleet which does not meet service and joint requirements, and a need to determine the composition and size of the future UGV fleet as combat operations end and financial resources are reduced.
This paper will analyze whether the U.S. Army needs a UGV deliberate strategy and provides potential recommendations for that strategy should it be required. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The first section presents the development of the current DoD UGV strategy and its evolution from the original Tactical Warfare Program Office (TWPO) Unmanned Ground Vehicle Master Plan (UGVMP). Then, the current DoD UGV strategy is summarized and a business strategy framework for conducting the strategy analysis is introduced. This is followed by an analysis of how environmental factors affect the UGV industry and an analysis of how the current UGV strategy links the organization to its industry environment. Following this analysis conclusions and recommendations are provided.
Background
The U.S. Army's current portfolio of unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs), a subset of a class of machines called mobile robots in academia, 2 is the culmination of more than forty years of effort by government organizations, commercial industry, and academic institutions. DoD funding of basic and applied research through the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) resulted in the first mobile robot developed in the late 1960's. 3 The initial success of this research and a belief in the potential of these devices caused U.S. government support for unmanned ground systems to grow steadily over time and was manifested in continuous funding of UGV research by a number of organizations including: DARPA, the Department of Energy (DOE), the Department of Transportation (DOT), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the U.S. Army's Tank-Automotive Command (TACOM) and Army Research Laboratory (ARL), the U.S. Air Force, and the U.S. Navy's Explosive
Ordnance Disposal Technology Division (NAVEODTECHDIV). 4 Unfortunately, there were very few experimental or deployable solutions that made their way to the field over more than twenty years of work.
In 1989, Congress "became increasingly concerned about the direction and composition of the many diverse robotics projects undertaken by the armed services and defense agencies" and requested the consolidation of all UGV projects under the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for policy and program direction to bring order to an otherwise disorganized situation. 5 OSD created the Unmanned Ground Vehicle and Systems Joint Project Office (UGV/S JPO) within the Tactical Warfare Program
Office (TWPO) with authority over ongoing UGV programs. The UGV/S JPO developed the first UGV strategy, the Unmanned Ground Vehicle Master Plan (UGVMP), to provide a single, integrated DoD document that laid out the strategy for introducing supervised robotic vehicles into the services and planning for the development and acquisition of UGV systems. In addition, the plan described a conceptual and management framework within which robotics projects were to be pursued, provided the details of the projects, and the relationship among them. 6 This plan and those that followed were intended to coordinate the activities of Department of Defense (DoD) agencies, universities, and industry partners involved in developing UGV capability.
The UGV/S JPO and its successors, most recently the Robotic Systems Joint Project
Office, continued driving DoD strategy regarding UGV's, but allowed the services and DoD agencies to work the details of implementing the strategy through their science and technology development processes. The impact of these OCO funded, urgent acquisitions on the UGV strategy included a significant advance in research and development and system fielding, and an unanticipated increase in current and future funding requirements, associated with fleet composition and developing, training and resourcing a maintenance and upgrade capability for this non-standard equipment. The majority of these costs were paid with OCO funds augmented with Army base budget funds. In the long term, OCO funds cannot defray these requirements due to regulations governing the use of those funds and the termination of this supplemental funding at the end of combat operations. The current UGV strategy does not address this long term maintenance and life cycle funding challenge. The USR FY11-36 also identifies the financial resources budgeted and programmed for unmanned systems' development, acquisition, and sustainment for the period FY11-15 in the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE)
system (See Table 1 ). 20 This description of the security environment is similar to that described in the latest version of the National Security Strategy (NSS), 21 the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG), 22 and the National Military Strategy (NMS) 23 indicating that the vision contained in the USR FY11-36 is synchronized with national strategic thought contained in these documents.
The Roadmap goes on to describe the specific unmanned capabilities desired and challenges to attaining these capabilities. In the most basic terms, the capabilities 
Force Application
The ability to integrate the use of maneuver and engagement in all environments to create the effects necessary to achieve mission objectives.
Protection
The ability to prevent/mitigate adverse effects of attacks on personnel (combatant/noncombatant) and physical assets of the United States, allies and friends.
Logistics
The ability to project and sustain a logistically ready joint force through the deliberate sharing of national and multi-national resources to effectively support operations, extend operational reach and provide the joint force commander the freedom f action necessary to meet mission objectives.
Building Partnerships
The ability to set the conditions for interaction with partner, competitor or adversary leaders, military forces, or relevant populations by developing and presenting information and conducting activities to affect their perceptions, will, behavior, and capabilities. Challenges to attaining the desired capabilities and the vision for unmanned systems include: affordability, interoperability, autonomy, airspace integration, communications, training, power and propulsion, and manned-unmanned teaming.
Each of these challenges is treated in a similar manner within the document: an overview and goal for the challenge area is stated, followed by a functional description of the challenge, next a description of the current state of the challenge is provided, this is followed by a problem statement that provides a detailed description of the problem to be addressed with the challenge, and a detailed list of steps for solving the challenge problem is provided in a way ahead section and the steps are displayed within a calendar for the 2011 to 2025 time frame. 26 While this methodology provides significant detail regarding the nature of the challenges facing unmanned system development, it has shortcomings. It does not provide definitive performance metrics to be used in determining success or failure in addressing these challenges. Further, the steps to addressing the challenges arranged The committee understands that Army leadership is in the process of determining operational and technical requirements for ground robotics vehicles that will guide the development of a long term research, development, and acquisition strategy. The committee is looking forward to seeing this strategy by the end of 2011 and looks forward to working with the Army to ensure that its research and development investments in robotic ground vehicles will meet current and future needs. defined to be its strengths and weaknesses and its external environmental circumstances were considered opportunities and threats. 34 Andrew's strategy analysis framework focuses on these strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats. This is referred to as "SWOT Analysis" and is taught in almost every college business program.
A criticism of this approach to strategy analysis is that classifying internal factors as strengths and weaknesses and external factors as threats and opportunities is imprecise. It is possible that a given company capability can be seen as both a strength and a weakness when evaluating the firm's internal capacity. This is also true when considering a firms external environment in that a given factor can be classified as both a threat and an opportunity. 35 Whether a factor is a strength, weakness, opportunity or threat is likely determined by the strategy pursued rather than its internal or external relationship to the firm. For example, the significant financial resources provided to the Army could be identified as a strength, if a financially conservative strategy is pursued, while the increase in the government budget deficit caused by provision of these same resources could be identified as a weakness if a financially aggressive or status quo strategy is pursued. These financial issues could also be categorized as opportunities or threats, if the resourcing process which is driven by DoD, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Congress is viewed as being external to the Army and achieving the strategy pursued requires more or less financial resources. This challenge of "SWOT" analysis makes it a less than optimal framework for conducting this analysis.
In 1980, Michael E. Porter offered another technique for analyzing business strategy in his book Competitive Strategies: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and
Competitors. 36 This technique is based on the forces that exist in a given industry and is called the "Five Forces Model". This model is generally used to determine competiveness of an industry and the attractiveness of entering a market. The criticism of this analytical approach is that it fails to account for a firm's internal capability; instead it has a focus on a firm's competitive position within a given industry. Further, the assumptions that underlie the model: an industry consists of unrelated buyers, sellers, substitutes, and competitors that do not interact or interact minimally, and that uncertainty is low, enabling the firm to predict its rivals' behavior and choose the potential strategy correctly. 37 These criticisms make this approach unsuitable for the analysis in this paper because the Army possesses substantial internal capability with regard to UGVs, has significant interaction with its suppliers, and has partnership agreements with other nations' armies who could be considered competitors. Finally, the environment in which the Army operates is characterized by a great deal of uncertainty. Thus, Porter's construct does not appear suitable for this entire analysis.
In 1991, Robert M. Grant in Contemporary Strategy Analysis proposed a tool for strategy analysis that models strategy as the link between a firm and its industry environment. The framework is based on four factors which appear to be conducive of success. These factors are simple, consistent, long term goals; profound understanding of the competitive environment; objective appraisal of resources; and effective implementation. To arrive at the figure below, the first three factors are attributed to the firm and the industry environment is defined as the firm's relationship with its customers, competitors, and suppliers. Analysis using this framework involves treating the strategy as a link between the firm and its industry environment and determining if the firm's decisions for deploying its resources within its environment and the firm's organization for implementing the strategy will satisfy its long-term goals. For a strategy to have the potential for success, it must be consistent with the firm's external environment and its internal environment. This model facilitates the analysis of the firms internal and external environments without the shortfall identified earlier in "SWOT Analysis". This is because the criticism of SWOT analysis, illustrated using the example of financial resources, is not present in this framework. Resources are defined as being internal to the firm rather than being characterized as a strength or weakness.
In addition to the basic strategy framework above, Grant incorporates an approach for analysis of the firm's industry environment which builds off of Political, Economic, Socio-cultural, and Technological (PEST) analysis. Grant adds the natural environment and demographic structure to the basic PEST analysis in order to address the issues related to long term sustainability of a business venture. When using a tool like PEST analysis or Grant's framework, it is appropriate to conduct the industry analysis prior to conducting the strategy analysis. This order allows one to focus the analysis on the environmental factors relevant to a firm's relationship with its customers, competitors and suppliers rather than all six possible factors. 39 This is the order which will be followed in this paper with an analysis of the environmental factors relevant to the UGV industry the Army must engage to gain the desired capability conducted prior to the strategy analysis. Following this industry analysis a strategy analysis using the Grant strategy analysis framework (Figure 1 ) will be provided. This strategy analysis will focus on the strategic vision contained in the in the USIR FY11-36 and 2011 UGSR. 
Environmental to Industry Analysis
The industry analysis framework will be used initially to look at the how national and international economic and government and political factors influence the Army's customers, suppliers and competitors. These factors were chosen because they appear to be the factors which are currently placing the greatest demands on the current UGV strategy.
In its most recent report, the World Bank forecasts global economic growth in a range of 2.5% to 3.1% over the next two years. The bank also forecast a growth rate in the range of 1.4% and 2.1% for the world's developed economies. 41 The International
Monetary Fund (IMF) was slightly more optimistic with projections of global economic growth in a range of 3.3% and 3.9% worldwide for 2012 and 2013. 42 The IMF also projects United States economic growth to be in the range of 1.8% and 2.2%. 43 It is these economic and government and political factors impact that will be analyzed in looking at the UGV industry and military robotics market. The military robotics market can be into space, air, ground, and sea related segments. The unmanned ground vehicle market has existed for at least twenty years with a focus on explosive ordnance disposal applications. 47 Growth in the ground segment has been driven by demands for products to support combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as increases in robotic technology and capability. Over the last ten years, this growth has resulted in at least 16 different manufactures providing UGV capability to the DoD. 48 This smaller number of large competitors in the market may be able to exert additional leverage over their suppliers. This is because these larger firms will reap market share abandoned by firms leaving the market. Providing products to this increased market share would require additional raw materials for manufacturing.
Purchasing greater quantities of raw materials from suppliers should result in volume This analysis and recent history shows that the UGV industry can support the current UGV strategy. It also appears that the industry would stabilize after cuts in spending in the UGV market related to slower world and economic growth and decrease DoD spending and continue its ability to support the result UGV strategy.
Analysis of DoD and Army UGV Strategy Using the Basic Framework
In this section the DoD and Army UGV strategy is analyzed to determine whether it provides a link between a these organizations and their industry environment that is conducive to successfully attaining UGV capabilities. This is done by examining the 50 This theory is further bolstered by language in the current National Security Strategy which states that "To succeed, we must also ensure that America stays on the cutting edge of the science and innovation that supports our prosperity, defense, and international technological leadership". The DAS is the management process that guides all DoD acquisition programs to provide effective, affordable, and timely systems to the users. 54 Again, this is a deliberate process and there are examples of acquisition programs which have taken more than ten years to achieve full operational capability. This has occurred in resourcing the current UGV fleet when OCO funding was insufficient to fund all related requirements for funds. Future budget numbers are also used as a baseline from which cuts are made during financial constrained decision making. Both unprogrammed requirements and unplanned budget reductions require prioritizing programs in order to support decision-making. The Army will fund the acquisition of UGV through its budget and should have some control over this process.
The current UGV strategy does not provide any prioritization and does not define service participation in acquisition and funding decisions this situation will need to be addressed to support effective implementation of the strategy. The funds provided the Army as a result of the PPBE process will fund transaction with UGV suppliers and will impact implementation of the strategy. In addition, the strategy identifies the challenges to acquiring UGV capability, but does not prioritize these challenges or suggest a method by which they could be prioritized. This lack of priorities or a method for prioritizing potentially affects ongoing, routine decision making. This lack of a method for prioritization would need to be addressed when rapid changes to the UGV program are required and a harried situation is not the time to conduct thorough and thoughtful analysis of alternatives to establish priorities.
Conclusions and Recommendations
As directed by Congress, the Army will develop and brief a UGV strategy of its own within the year. The previously identified shortcomings in the DoD strategy along with other service specific issues must be addressed in that document to demonstrate to Congress that the Army has a strategy that addresses congressional concerns and facilitates effect implementation of the strategy to gain UGV capability. 
